Leveraged ETF Return Convergence and the Market-Support Hypothesis: A Test Report
Contents14 sections
- One. Summary
- Two. Research question and method
- Three. Theoretical mechanism
- Four. Event master table
- Five. Window comparison
- 5.1 2006-2012 sample (n=40 events × windows: of the 42 events, the two M01 rows have window start dates before SSO/QLD listed on 2006-06-21 and so have no Spread; 01a §3.1 / §7.2)
- 5.2 2006-2026 full scan grid (03 §2 / §4, abs10pp / arming threshold P=10pp, primary basis)
- 5.3 Calendar-year window (02 §6.2, n=18-19 annual observations)
- 5.4 Confidence-level summary
- Six. Counterexample analysis
- Seven. Review of existing research
- Eight. Confounders and null controls
- Nine. List of data gaps
- Ten. Recommendations for the computational version
- Eleven. Draft preliminary decision rules
- Twelve. Complete list of reference sources
- Further reading
- Frequently asked questions
Research date: 2026-10-24. This report consolidates the seven research lines (01a, 01b, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06) in
research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/andresearch_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support/05_literature_practice.md(existing research and practitioner approaches; folder names are translated from the Chinese originals). The author did not compute any additional numbers; every number is labeled with its source. The fileResearch report_2026-10-24.md(file name translated; located in the same notes folder) is a draft of unknown origin and, as instructed, was not used or cited at all.
Site note: This article is the full text of a report researched by the site owner; content and numbers are published as in the original, without deletions or rewriting. Labels such as "01a §1.1", "04 KQ3" and "06 Question Three" refer to the author's research notes (folder
research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/): 01a =01a_events_2006_2012.md, 01b =01b_events_2013_2026.md, 02 =02_annual_quarterly_returns.md, 03 =03_convergence_event_scan.md, 04 =04_counterexamples.md, 05 =05_theory_volatility_decay.md("05 theory" in the text also refers to this file), 06 =06_null_confounders.md; the literature review is inresearch_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support/05_literature_practice.md. In the original draft these labels were links to files on the author's own computer, which cannot be opened on the website, so they are kept as plain text to preserve the attribution. Returns are primarily price returns (split-adjusted, dividends not included), with data through 2026-10-22. This article is a research record, not investment advice.
One. Summary
Does the evidence support the hypothesis? It does not support the strong version, and the weak version receives only conditional, low-strength support. This report consolidates four mutually independent quantitative research paths: (1) systematic peak-trough event identification for 2006-06-21~2012-12-31 (research line 01a, n=24 independent paired events, plus 16 heavily overlapping mid-crisis trough sub-events during the global financial crisis), (2) systematic peak-trough event identification for 2013-01-01~2026-10-22 (research line 01b, 19 events, 38 paired observations), (3) a full grid scan of indicator × tolerance band × arming threshold for 2006-10-19~2026-10-22 (research line 03, 480 primary-basis cells, 381 deduplicated event days), and (4) daily control regressions and matched-sample null tests for 2007-06~2026-10 (research line 06). The conclusions are highly consistent: "the Spread happening to converge into the tolerance band on the day of the trough" is a minority case, not the norm. In the cleanest 2006-2012 main sample, where the two pairs are most comparable (12M window, ±10pp band), only 5 of 24 events (20.8%) fell inside the band on the trough day (Chapter Four section 4.1 and Chapter Seven section 7.1; original source 01a §7.1). In the 2013-2026 sample, with shallower declines and more corrections, about 14 of 38 paired observations (36.8%) fell inside the band (Chapter Four section 4.3, derived from 01b §1.3), showing that the success rate itself swings widely with the type of market conditions the sample covers and is not a stable base rate.
The more fundamental theoretical finding is that this Spread is almost entirely a deterministic function of "the underlying's N-period return + realized volatility + financing and fee costs". Fitting the Avellaneda & Zhang (2010) exact compounding formula to the full-sample daily Spread from 2006-09 to 2026-10 yields explanatory power of R²=0.9975~0.9989 (Chapter Three; original source 05 §5.4). Moreover, at the moment the Spread drops into the tolerance band from above, the underlying's same-period return was positive in 100% of 24 scenarios spanning SSO/QLD, 3M/6M/12M, 5pp/10pp band widths and price/total-return bases, with medians of +4.9% to +15.7% (Chapter Three; original source 05 §5.5). In other words, "convergence" overwhelmingly marks "after the underlying has already risen for a while and volatility has cooled", not the middle of a decline or the day of the bottom. This is systematically out of step, in time order, with the hypothesis's literal expectation of "a leading or coincident signal of a stop-the-decline rebound". The full scan grid further confirms that 62%~65% of convergence events occur in calm markets where the underlying is less than 5% below its 52-week high, and only 3~5 events (a share of <2%) occur during genuinely deep declines with a drawdown of 20% or more from the high (Chapter Six; original source 03 §9.1).
Windows and tolerance bands most worth validating first: after circular-shift testing plus Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction, only 19 of 198 testable cells survive at q<0.10 (the smallest q value is only 0.04; Chapter Five section 5.2, original source 03 §3). Among them, the 6-month window has the highest directional consistency between Pair A and Pair B (76%, 55/72 cells in the same direction; Chapter Five section 5.2, original source 03 §4), making it the relatively most defensible candidate in the existing evidence, but still far from conclusive. The share of troughs that fall inside the ±10pp band on the trough day barely differs across the four windows in the 40 event × window observations for 2006-2012 (3M 22.5%; 6M, 12M and YTD all 25%), and 12M is 20.8% in the n=24 main sample; the sample is too small to distinguish signal from noise. Confidence level: low to moderate. Under their own independent methodologies, the five research lines (01a, 01b, 03, 05, 06) converge on highly similar wording: "the existing evidence is insufficient to support the strong version of the hypothesis that 'Spread convergence is a reliable signal of the market stopping its decline and rebounding'".
Main counterexamples: the 2010 April-July flash-crash correction (on the trough day the 12M Spread for Pair A / Pair B was still +13.6pp / +17.6pp, far above the +10pp upper edge, the exact opposite of the hypothesis; Chapter Six, original source 01a §6.2); the full-year 2022 bear market (after Pair B's 6M window converged into the band on 2022-01-04, the market fell another -34.40%, the deepest "early convergence" counterexample in the entire dataset; Chapter Six, original source 04 KQ3); the 2020 COVID crash (on the day of the true bottom the two pairs' Spread was still -21.1pp / -12.1pp, deeply negative and never converged); and 2007-11→2008-01 and 2008-05/07 (after Pair B converged, the Nasdaq-100 fell another 42%~50%, taking 130~250 trading days; Chapter Six, original source 04 KQ1). "The evidence is insufficient to support this hypothesis" is the positioning this report considers most prudent and most consistent with the unanimous conclusion of the five research lines.
Two. Research question and method
The question this report answers is: "When the Spread between the rolling N-period returns of SSO (2x leveraged S&P 500) and QLD (2x leveraged Nasdaq-100) and the rolling N-period returns of their underlyings VOO (proxied by SPY before September 2010) and QQQ converges from clearly positive into the tolerance band, does the market tend to stop declining and rebound?" On that basis it identifies the most likely effective observation windows and tolerance bands, and lists counterexamples and data gaps. The methodological positioning must be stated first: this report is a consolidation of an event study and a literature review, not a full trading backtest. No executable entry/exit rules were built, no trading costs or slippage were included, no equity-curve simulation was done, and there was no out-of-sample validation. Any descriptive statistics in the research lines such as "returns are higher after the signal" are comparisons of conditional average returns against an unconditional baseline, not strategy performance.
Shared data foundation: all seven research lines use the same batch of raw data from the Yahoo Finance v8 chart API (SSO, QLD, SPY, VOO, QQQ, URL format https://query1.finance.yahoo.com/v8/finance/chart/{TICKER}?period1=0&period2=9999999999&interval=1d&events=div%2Csplit&includeAdjustedClose=true), downloaded around 2026-10-23 11:34 UTC, with the last complete daily bar on 2026-10-22. The first available trading day for SSO / QLD is 2006-06-21; the first available trading day for VOO is 2010-09-09 (before that date Pair A is always proxied by proportionally chained SPY, with every record flagged in a proxy field). The primary basis is close (split-adjusted, dividends not included, the same basis as Google Finance, used for the main Spread calculation); the robustness basis is adjclose (dividend-reinvested total return). VIX / VXN come from FRED VIXCLS / VXNCLS or the official CBOE history files (the two were cross-checked and agree); financing rates use FRED DFF (effective federal funds rate) cross-referenced with DTB3 (3-month Treasury bill).
The four quantitative research paths and how they complement each other:
- Systematic event identification (01a: 2006-2012; 01b: 2013-2026): run a 10%/10% zigzag on each of the VOO(SPY) and QQQ close series (a 10% drop after a peak enters a "trough", and a 10% rise after the trough is needed to confirm a complete swing), identifying all peak-trough swings with a closing decline of >10%; in addition, a 5%/5% zigzag carves out the mid-crisis trough substructure named in the brief for the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Each event records the four-window 3M/6M/12M/YTD Spread on the trough day and 1/2/3 months before the trough (T, T-1M, T-2M, T-3M), tolerance-band flags, P/SMA position relative to moving averages, realized volatility and VIX/VXN, plus the underlying's forward returns 1/3/6/12 months after the trough. A "convergence event" is defined as follows: a window's Spread reached ≥+10pp at some point in the past 126 trading days (about 6 months) ("armed"), and then the first transition from outside the band to |Spread|≤10pp (or ≤5pp) is recorded as one qualifying band-entry event, along with how many trading days it led/lagged the trough; a 63~126 trading-day cooldown prevents repeated entries and exits at the band edge from the same lead being double-counted.
- Full scan grid (03): generalizes the tolerance-band test to 15 indicators (3M/6M/12M/YTD return differences, 4 kinds of moving-average rate of change, price/SMA ratio) × 8 tolerance bands (absolute ±5pp/±10pp, relative ±10%/20%/30%, each in a "no floor" and a "|base|≥2pp floor" version) × 2 arming thresholds (10pp/20pp) × 2 pairs × 2 bases (price/total return), for 672 cells in total. For every cell, all qualifying events undergo a circular-shift null-distribution test and Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction; this is the only research line in this report that systematically handles the "data snooping" problem.
- Calendar-period analysis (02): computes the Spread using fixed calendar anchors (annual/quarterly/monthly, rather than rolling windows starting on arbitrary trading days). The sample is inherently much smaller (only 18~19 annual observations) but close to independent, and is used to test whether the "calendar-period Spread" and the "rolling-period Spread" have consistent screening power (conclusion: they do not; see Chapter Five).
- Null controls and control regressions (06): uses a theoretical model Spread constructed directly from "the underlying's own past return + realized volatility" to test whether real Spread convergence events are equivalent to events of this frictionless model (the control group), and uses Newey-West regressions and a matched-sample permutation test (placebo test) to check whether, after controlling for the underlying's return and volatility, the Spread still has incremental explanatory power for forward returns.
- Theoretical derivation (05): starting from the continuous-time exact compounding formula of Avellaneda & Zhang (2010), derives the analytic form of Spread(R) for a 2x leveraged ETF and its zero-crossing point R*, and validates the formula's fit against ProShares' official "Estimated Fund Returns" table and our own daily data.
- Counterexample study (04): examines, one by one, the historical periods named in the brief (2007-08, 2011, 2015-16, 2018, 2020, 2022, 2025) for cases of "a large decline after convergence" or "no convergence at all near the bottom" (false negatives), and quantifies the contribution of three confounding mechanisms: volatility, financing cost and dividends.
- Review of existing literature and practice (
Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support/05_literature_practice.md): surveys academic papers, regulatory documents and practitioner strategies to establish whether the "leveraged-minus-underlying return spread" itself has ever been studied as a timing signal.
Evidence grading follows the three-tier scheme used consistently by the five research lines: (a) own calculations (computed directly by this series' researchers from the shared data and scripts above; the source labels the file name and script path), (b) third-party research or official data (academic papers, regulatory documents, issuer prospectuses), (c) forums or anecdotes (blogs, search-engine snippets, unverified secondhand accounts). This report labels the grade at each citation; where numbers from different sources disagree, both are shown side by side with the reason for the one adopted.
Three. Theoretical mechanism
A leveraged ETF's "daily objective" is a fixed multiple of the underlying index's single-day return, but the multi-day cumulative return is not the same multiple of the underlying's multi-day return. This gap (commonly called volatility decay / beta slippage) has an exact mathematical solution. Avellaneda, M. & Zhang, S. (2010), "Path-Dependence of Leveraged ETF Returns" (SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics 1:586–603; this series' researchers read the full text and checked the formula, evidence grade (b)), gives the continuous-time exact expression (equation 10 in the original):
L_t/L_0 = (S_t/S_0)^β · exp[ ((1−β)r − f)t + β∫λ_sds + (β−β²)/2 · V_t ]
Here β is the leverage multiple, r is the reference financing rate, f is the fund's own expense ratio, V_t=∫σ_s²ds is the realized variance, and λ appears only when an inverse fund has a stock-borrow cost (λ=0 for long funds). With β=2, (1−β)=−1 and (β−β²)/2=−1; letting R=S_t/S_0−1 (the underlying's N-period return) and c=(β−1)r+f=r+f (cost), we can solve ((05 §2); derived step by step algebraically by this series' researchers and back-checked against ProShares' official "Estimated Fund Returns" table):
L(R) = (1+R)²·k − 1, k = exp[−(σ²T + cT)]
Spread(R) = L(R) − R = (1+R)·[(1+R)·k − 1]
The nonzero solution of Spread=0 (the leverage-decay zero-crossing point R\*):
R* = 1/k − 1 = exp(σ²T + cT) − 1
This formula has three implications central to this report. First, Spread(R) is an upward-opening parabola whose minimum occurs near R_min=1/(2k)−1≈−50% (not at R=0 or at the market's deepest drop). This explains why the deepest negative Spreads in history mostly occurred when the underlying was down about -40%~-50% (such as 2008-11 and 2009-03), rather than when the underlying had just started to fall or had already reached its deepest point ((05 §2.4)). Second, R* rises monotonically with realized volatility σ²T and cost cT: validated under ProShares' official zero-cost assumption (c=0), with σ=40% and T=1 year, R*=exp(0.16)−1=+17.35% (checked cell by cell against the ProShares official "Estimated Fund Returns" table cell where a −20% underlying return at 50% volatility corresponds to a leveraged ETF return of −50.2%; all 8 sampled sets match to one decimal place, (05 §4.5)). With a 12-month window, 20% annualized volatility and 3% annualized cost, R*≈+7.3% ((05 §4.3)), rising to +10.5% at 6% cost (the recent high-rate environment) ((05 §4.4)). In other words, the same ±10pp tolerance band corresponds to completely different underlying return levels under different volatility and interest-rate regimes; it is not a threshold that is stable across periods. Third, the commonly used linear approximation Spread_lin≈R−σ²T−cT is only the first-order Taylor expansion of the exact expression in R and ε=σ²T+cT, and it systematically underestimates the true L when |R| is large (because it drops the R² term in the expansion of (1+R)²). For example, with σ=20%, T=1 year and c=3%, the exact Spread at R=+50% is +59.8pp while the linear approximation gives only +43.0pp, a difference of 16.8pp ((05 §3)).
Empirical validation (own calculation, evidence (a)): using daily total-return data for SSO/QLD against VOO (including the SPY proxy)/QQQ, fitting the exact formula above to the full-sample daily Spread from 2006-09 to 2026-10 yields explanatory power of R²=0.9987 (SSO 3M), 0.9984 (6M), 0.9975 (12M); for QLD the corresponding values are 0.9989, 0.9988, 0.9985, with root-mean-square residuals of only 0.29~0.93pp (far smaller than the Spread's own magnitude, which routinely reaches ±10~30pp); over the same period the linear approximation's R² is only 0.871~0.947 ((05 §5.4)). During crises (2008-11-20, 2009-03-09) the model fit is actually the most accurate (residuals of only 0.04~0.47pp), so the conclusion in Avellaneda & Zhang's original paper, "formula explains well the behavior of the price of LETFs", still holds 17 years later for the two funds SSO/QLD. Evidence that addresses the hypothesis even more directly: find every trading day on which "the Spread falls from above (>band width b) into the band (≤b)" and record the distribution of the underlying's N-period return R on that day. Across 24 scenarios spanning SSO/QLD, 3M/6M/12M and 5pp/10pp band widths, R is positive in all (100%) of them, with medians between +4.9%~+15.7% ((05 §5.5)), consistent in magnitude with the theoretical R* (R* is slightly below the observed median because the observation records the moment the Spread drops through +b, not the moment the Spread is exactly 0, which is the expected direction). This means: "spread convergence" carries almost no independent information beyond (R, σ²T, c). To argue that Spread convergence carries independent information that "predicts the market stopping its decline and rebounding", one must show that after controlling for the underlying's return and realized volatility, the Spread (or its residual) still has incremental predictive power for future returns; the null-control analysis in Chapter Eight shows that this incremental predictive power does not exist.
Four. Event master table
Method note (applies to the whole chapter): the "In tolerance band?" column uses a literal test = whether the absolute value of the 12-month window Spread on the trough day is ≤10pp (the 12M window was chosen as representative because it matches the "rolling return" scale most often cited for the hypothesis and is the window shared by both event-study paths and the full scan grid; comparison numbers for the 3M/6M/YTD windows are in Chapter Five). The § numbers in the "Data source" field refer to sections of the research notes listed at the end of this chapter. The "Verdict" column distinguishes these categories: Success = the trough day was indeed inside the band, and an earlier arming (≥+10pp) made it a qualifying convergence event; Early convergence then divergence = it qualified for band entry before the trough, but on the trough day it had already diverged outside the band again; Never converged = never qualified for band entry at any point (including the technical case "the value on the trough day happens to be inside the band but was never armed beforehand", noted in the remarks and not counted as a success; for the reason see the "convergence event" definition in methodology Chapter Two); Counterexample (opposite direction) = the Spread on the trough day was still strongly positive, directly contradicting the direction of the hypothesis; Insufficient data = SSO/QLD had not yet listed or had been listed for less than 12 months.
4.1 2006-06-21~2012-12-31: 12 main events × 2 pairs (n=24, main sample)
Data source: 01a §1.1 (peaks, troughs and drawdowns), §3 (trough-day Spread), §4.1 (VIX / realized volatility), §5.1 (forward returns), §6.2 / §7.1 (convergence classification), grade (a), calculation script data/events_2006_2012/events_2006_2012.py.
| Trough date | Benchmark | Benchmark's own drawdown % | VIX | 12M Spread (pp) | In tolerance band? | Benchmark forward 1M/3M/6M/12M % | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-06-13 | SPY | −7.59 | 23.81 | n/a | Insufficient data | 1.2 / 7.9 / 15.8 / 23.9 | Insufficient data (SSO/QLD not yet listed) |
| 2006-07-21 | QQQ | −17.38 | 17.40 | n/a | Insufficient data | 7.6 / 17.6 / 23.7 / 40.2 | Insufficient data (SSO/QLD had only 1 month of data) |
| 2008-03-10 | SPY | −18.20 | 29.38 | −16.6 | No | 6.3 / 6.2 / −3.3 / −43.6 | Early convergence then divergence (first band entry on 2008-01-07; the market then fell by more than another one-fifth before the true trough, see §6.2) |
| 2008-03-10 | QQQ | −25.02 | 29.38 | −16.9 | No | 10.4 / 17.6 / 3.7 / −33.8 | Early convergence then divergence |
| 2008-10-10 | SPY | −38.13 | 69.95 | −27.6 | No | 4.7 / 0.7 / −3.0 / 21.2 | Never converged (a mid-bear-market trough, not the true bottom) |
| 2008-10-10 | QQQ | −38.04 | 69.95 | −30.0 | No | −1.8 / −4.0 / 5.2 / 35.6 | Never converged |
| 2008-10-27 | SPY | −17.17 | 80.06 | −29.0 | No | 6.0 / 0.7 / 2.3 / 26.8 | Never converged |
| 2008-10-27 | QQQ | −18.33 | 80.06 | −30.3 | No | 2.3 / 2.2 / 17.6 / 47.6 | Never converged |
| 2008-11-20 | SPY | −24.86 | 80.86 | −29.6 | No | 16.9 / 2.6 / 20.0 / 45.0 | Never converged (the highest VIX close on record, see the third-party check in §8.2) |
| 2008-11-20 | QQQ | −24.27 | 80.86 | −30.6 | No | 16.8 / 12.9 / 34.1 / 70.0 | Never converged |
| 2009-03-09 | SPY | −27.13 | 49.68 | −29.8 | No | 26.0 / 39.0 / 52.3 / 68.1 | Never converged (the true low for SPY over the whole period, yet its Spread is one of the most negative in this sample; see false negatives in Chapter Six) |
| 2009-01-20 | QQQ | −10.76 | 56.65 | −30.7 | No | −3.9 / 3.5 / 18.1 / 41.4 | Never converged |
| 2009-03-09 | SPY (duplicate trough) | −22.06 | 49.68 | −29.8 | No | 26.0 / 39.0 / 52.3 / 68.1 | Never converged (same trough as the row above) |
| 2009-03-09 | QQQ | −18.29 | 49.68 | −31.1 | No | 28.0 / 43.6 / 59.6 / 81.8 | Never converged |
| 2010-07-02 | SPY | −16.10 | 30.12 | +13.6 | No | 10.3 / 12.1 / 23.0 / 31.0 | Counterexample (opposite direction): on the flash-crash correction trough day the leveraged fund was still clearly ahead; never converged |
| 2010-07-02 | QQQ | −15.93 | 30.12 | +17.6 | No | 9.9 / 15.4 / 28.2 / 36.4 | Counterexample (opposite direction) |
| 2011-08-19 | QQQ | −16.10 | 43.05 | +8.9 | Yes | 13.2 / 10.7 / 26.8 / 36.6 | Success |
| 2011-10-03 | SPY | −19.42 | 45.45 | −5.6 | Yes | 14.8 / 16.0 / 28.5 / 32.0 | Success |
| 2011-11-25 | SPY | −9.55 | 34.47 | −6.0 | Yes (by value) | 8.6 / 17.7 / 13.5 / 21.5 | Value inside the band, but never armed beforehand (never reached ≥+10pp), so technically not counted as a qualifying convergence event |
| 2011-11-25 | QQQ | −10.28 | 34.47 | −5.0 | Yes (by value) | 6.1 / 21.0 / 17.4 / 22.7 | Same as above |
| 2012-06-01 | QQQ | −11.49 | 26.66 | +0.9 | Yes | 6.2 / 12.8 / 8.9 / 21.3 | Success |
| 2012-06-04 | SPY | −9.69 | 26.12 | −4.7 | Yes (by value) | 7.3 / 10.1 / 10.3 / 27.7 | Value inside the band, but never armed beforehand |
| 2012-11-15 | SPY | −7.84 | 17.99 | +8.6 | Yes | 4.7 / 12.1 / 22.4 / 32.7 | Success |
| 2012-11-15 | QQQ | −11.89 | 17.99 | +5.2 | Yes | 4.3 / 9.2 / 18.8 / 35.4 | Success |
Subtotal (n=24, 12M / 10pp, 01a §7.1): never converged 17 (70.8%, including 2 with insufficient data and 2 in the opposite direction), early convergence then divergence 2 (8.3%), inside the band on the trough day 5 (20.8%, of which 3 are genuinely qualifying convergences and 2 are numerical coincidences that did not follow an arming path).
4.2 2007-10~2009-03 global financial crisis: the GFC parent event and 16 mid-crisis trough sub-events (not independent samples)
Data source: 01a §2, grade (a). GFC parent event: SPY peak 2007-10-09 (156.48) → trough 2009-03-09 (68.11), closing decline −56.47%; QQQ peak 2007-10-31 (55.03) → trough 2008-11-20 (25.56), closing decline −53.55% (the Nasdaq-100's lowest close came nearly 4 months before the S&P 500's, confirmed by third-party cross-checks; see Chapters Seven/Twelve). This parent event and the 16 mid-crisis trough sub-events carved out by a 5%/5% zigzag overlap heavily with the peak-trough ranges of M02-M07 in the table above (for example, the trough dates of GFC-SPY-L9 / GFC-QQQ-L7 are identical to the GFC parent event and M06/M07), so they are not independent statistical samples. All of 01a's cross-event statistics (Chapter Five) therefore use the n=24 of section 4.1 as the main sample; this section only supplements the internal structure of the bear market for verification.
The 12M Spread for SPY and the corresponding classification (12M / 10pp) at the five mid-crisis troughs named in the user's brief are as follows: 2008-01-22 (GFC-SPY-L2, Spread −15.9pp, no); 2008-03-10 (GFC-SPY-L3, Spread −16.6pp, no, same day as M02/SPY); 2008-07-15 (GFC-SPY-L4, Spread −23.4pp, no); 2008-11-20 (GFC-SPY-L8, Spread −29.6pp, no, same day as M05/SPY); 2009-03-09 (GFC-SPY-L9, Spread −29.8pp, no, same day as M06/M07/SPY, and also the true low for SPY over the whole period). None of the five named troughs fell inside the ±10pp tolerance band. This is the clearest single cluster of counterexamples in this report: not one of the core global-financial-crisis troughs the brief focuses on converged in the literal sense of the Spread.
4.3 2013-2026: 19 events, 38 paired observations (01b §1.3 table with tolerance-band verdicts added)
Data source: 01b §1.3 (event × pair overview table, already containing base drawdown / lev drawdown / VIX / 12M Spread / YTD Spread / forward returns) + per-event detail tables (§2), grade (a), calculation scripts data/events_2013_2026/{find_drawdowns.py,analysis.py}. The "In tolerance band?" column is a literal verdict added by this report based on |Spread_12M@T|≤10pp (not a column in the original 01b table, but the numbers are taken directly from the original table's Spread_12M@T column without any additional calculation); E10c2 Pair A and E10c Pair A are a duplicate listing of the same trough (2022-10-12) and are not double-counted in statistics.
| Event | Name | Pair | Trough | base drawdown % | lev drawdown % | 12M Spread (pp) | In tolerance band? | VIX at trough | fwd3M% / fwd12M% | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E01 | 2015-08 trough | A | 2015-08-25 | −12.34 | −23.23 | −5.77 | Yes | 36.02 | 11.90 / 16.44 | Success |
| E01 | 2015-08 trough | B | 2015-08-25 | −13.94 | −26.47 | −2.87 | Yes | 36.02 | 16.37 / 18.88 | Success |
| E02 | 2016-02 trough | A | 2016-02-11 | −13.30 | −25.11 | −10.59 | No (missed by only 0.59pp) | 28.14 | 12.94 / 26.76 | Never converged (borderline counterexample) |
| E02 | 2016-02 trough | B | 2016-02-09 | −16.36 | −30.78 | −8.67 | Yes | 26.54 | 9.93 / 31.81 | Success |
| E03 | 2018-02 Volmageddon | A | 2018-02-08 | −10.09 | −19.54 | +14.09 | No | 33.46 | 3.53 / 5.01 | Counterexample (opposite direction) |
| E03 | 2018-02 Volmageddon | B | 2018-02-08 | −10.23 | −19.72 | +22.94 | No | 33.46 | 8.22 / 9.85 | Counterexample (opposite direction) |
| E04 | 2018-04 retest | A | 2018-04-02 | −10.21 | −19.88 | +9.41 | Yes | 23.62 | 5.63 / 11.05 | Success |
| E04 | 2018-04 retest | B | 2018-04-02 | −10.67 | −20.31 | +16.45 | No | 23.62 | 11.12 / 17.50 | Never converged |
| E05 | 2018-Q4 | A | 2018-12-24 | −20.27 | −36.63 | −12.74 | No | 36.07 | 19.24 / 37.24 | Early convergence then divergence (most recent qualifying band entry 51 trading days earlier, see 04 KQ2) |
| E05 | 2018-Q4 | B | 2018-12-24 | −23.16 | −42.46 | −13.08 | No | 36.07 | 24.43 / 47.68 | Early convergence then divergence (most recent qualifying band entry 39 trading days earlier) |
| E06 | 2019-05 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2019-06-03 | −6.64 | −13.26 | −2.60 | Yes (VOO itself did not reach the 10% threshold; shown for comparison) | 18.86 | 5.95 / 13.84 | Reference (not an independent event) |
| E06 | 2019-05 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2019-06-03 | −10.98 | −21.21 | −7.50 | Yes | 18.86 | 9.13 / 39.13 | Success |
| E07 | 2020 COVID | A | 2020-03-23 | −34.30 | −59.34 | −21.07 | No | 61.59 | 41.07 / 75.95 | Never converged (deeply negative) |
| E07 | 2020 COVID | B | 2020-03-16 | −28.56 | −51.72 | −12.10 | No | 82.69 | 43.44 / 89.36 | Never converged |
| E08 | 2020-09 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2020-09-23 | −9.45 | −18.40 | −2.97 | Yes (reference) | 28.58 | 13.48 / 37.32 | Reference (not an independent event) |
| E08 | 2020-09 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2020-09-23 | −12.75 | −24.51 | +29.15 | No | 28.58 | 16.67 / 41.19 | Counterexample (opposite direction) |
| E09 | 2021-02/03 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2021-03-04 | −4.07 | −8.21 | +10.87 | No (borderline) | 28.57 | 12.17 / 14.73 | Never converged (reference event) |
| E09 | 2021-02/03 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2021-03-08 | −10.85 | −21.02 | +37.62 | No | 25.47 | 12.28 / 7.80 | Counterexample (opposite direction) |
| E10a | 2022 bear market, leg 1 | A | 2022-03-08 | −12.87 | −24.89 | +8.63 | Yes | 35.13 | −1.23 / −4.22 | Success (but the following 12 months were still a negative return; see Chapter Six) |
| E10a | 2022 bear market, leg 1 | B | 2022-03-14 | −21.24 | −39.68 | −3.69 | Yes | 31.77 | −13.28 / −6.54 | Success (the following 12 months were still a negative return) |
| E10b | 2022 bear market, leg 2 | A | 2022-06-16 | −20.56 | −38.31 | −13.59 | No | 32.95 | 5.57 / 20.23 | Never converged |
| E10b | 2022 bear market, leg 2 | B | 2022-06-16 | −26.89 | −48.51 | −20.94 | No | 32.95 | 6.61 / 35.57 | Never converged |
| E10c | 2022 bear market, leg 3 | A | 2022-10-12 | −17.06 | −31.79 | −17.66 | No | 33.57 | 11.34 / 21.63 | Never converged |
| E10c | 2022 bear market, leg 3 | B | 2022-10-14 | −21.71 | −40.05 | −25.74 | No | 32.02 | 7.76 / 40.09 | Never converged |
| E10c2 | 2022-11-03 QQQ trough | B | 2022-11-03 | −21.79 | −40.64 | −27.14 (the deepest counterexample in this dataset) | No | 25.30 | 17.54 / 41.16 | Counterexample: converged early, then fell deeper; see Chapter Six KQ3 |
| E10d | 2022-12-28 QQQ bottom | A | 2022-12-28 | −7.57 | −14.70 | −20.47 | No | 22.14 | 5.01 / 26.52 | Never converged |
| E10d | 2022-12-28 QQQ bottom | B | 2022-12-28 | −11.45 | −22.17 | −27.97 | No | 22.14 | 18.08 / 58.13 | Never converged |
| E11 | 2023-07→10 | A | 2023-10-27 | −10.31 | −20.68 | +1.89 | Yes | 21.27 | 18.79 / 41.06 | Success |
| E11 | 2023-07→10 | B | 2023-10-26 | −10.91 | −22.60 | +14.56 | No | 20.68 | 23.32 / 44.13 | Never converged |
| E12 | 2024-07→08 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2024-08-05 | −8.45 | −16.70 | +10.15 | No (borderline) | 38.57 | 11.55 / 21.50 | Never converged (reference) |
| E12 | 2024-07→08 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2024-08-07 | −13.56 | −26.20 | +7.26 | Yes | 27.85 | 18.12 / 30.93 | Success |
| E13 | 2025 tariff shock | A | 2025-04-08 | −18.97 | −35.34 | −10.63 | No (borderline) | 52.33 | 24.85 / 36.04 | Never converged |
| E13 | 2025 tariff shock | B | 2025-04-08 | −22.88 | −41.79 | −13.82 | No | 52.33 | 32.75 / 45.67 | Never converged |
| E14 | 2025-10→2026-03 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2026-03-30 | −9.19 | −18.34 | +6.22 | Yes | 30.61 | 18.23 / (truncated) | Success (reference; VOO did not reach the 10% threshold) |
| E14 | 2025-10→2026-03 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2026-03-30 | −12.19 | −25.17 | +9.48 | Yes | 30.61 | 31.91 / (truncated) | Success |
| E15 | 2026-06→07 (QQQ only >10%) | A | 2026-06-10 | −4.47 | −9.00 | +16.46 | No (reference) | 22.22 | 4.44 / (truncated) | Never converged (reference; VOO did not reach the 10% threshold) |
| E15 | 2026-06→07 (QQQ only >10%) | B | 2026-07-29 | −11.32 | −22.83 | +8.62 | Yes | 20.66 | (truncated) / (truncated) | Success |
Subtotal (38 paired observations, including 4 VOO reference rows for "QQQ only >10%" and 1 duplicate E10c2/E10c row; after removing them, n=33 independent genuine >10% events): those literally inside the ±10pp band number about 14/38 (36.8%); many of the "success" events are concentrated in the shallower (−10%~−22%) corrections of 2015, 2018-04, 2023 and 2024, consistent with the 01a main-sample pattern that "success cases concentrate in shallower corrections" (see Chapters Five and Six). The 12-month forward returns for 2026 up to the research date (2026-10-22) are still truncated, as noted.
Five. Window comparison
This chapter compares how the four candidate windows, 3M / 6M / 12M / YTD, perform on the question of "whether the Spread has converged on the trough day", and tests whether Pair A (SSO/VOO) and Pair B (QLD/QQQ) show the same tendency. Core conclusion: no window wins consistently in any sample, and different research paths give not entirely consistent answers to "which window is better". This in itself is evidence against the hypothesis's expectation that "a universal best window exists".
5.1 2006-2012 sample (n=40 events × windows: of the 42 events, the two M01 rows have window start dates before SSO/QLD listed on 2006-06-21 and so have no Spread; 01a §3.1 / §7.2)
| Window | Share inside 10pp band | Share inside 5pp band |
|---|---|---|
| 3M | 22.5% (9/40) | 10.0% (4/40) |
| 6M | 25.0% (10/40) | 10.0% (4/40) |
| 12M | 25.0% (10/40) | 10.0% (4/40) |
| YTD | 25.0% (10/40) | 5.0% (2/40) |
In this sample the four windows show almost no difference (the share inside the 10pp band ranges from 22.5%~25.0%); YTD has the lowest share in the narrow 5pp band (5.0%), and the other three windows are identical. This sample provides no evidence that any one window is clearly better than the others.
5.2 2006-2026 full scan grid (03 §2 / §4, abs10pp / arming threshold P=10pp, primary basis)
The "share beating the baseline after the event" (S5) in the table below measures "whether the average 6-month return after a qualifying convergence event beats the full-sample unconditional baseline". It is not the same as "inside the band on the trough day", but it is the only indicator in this report that underwent circular-shift statistical testing and multiple-comparison correction, and it is used to assess the statistical credibility of each window's signal:
| Window | Pair | Event count n | S5 (beats baseline) % | Difference from baseline (fwd6M, pp) | p (circular shift, fwd6M) | Same tendency for A/B? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3M | A | 33 | 62% | +1.76 | 0.10 | No (B's p=0.85, diff negative) |
| 3M | B | 42 | 54% | −1.47 | 0.85 | — |
| 6M | A | 37 | 63% | +1.34 | 0.13 | Yes (both positive, neither p reaches 0.05) |
| 6M | B | 39 | 62% | +1.52 | 0.15 | Yes |
| 12M | A | 25 | 75% | +3.50 | 0.04 | Yes (both positive, A significant) |
| 12M | B | 23 | 73% | +2.75 | 0.13 | Yes |
| YTD | A | 14 | 85% | +5.13 | 0.03 | No (B's p=0.33, magnitude far smaller than A) |
| YTD | B | 23 | 52% | +1.32 | 0.33 | — |
The most important cross-check in this chapter: the 12-month window is the only window where "both pairs are positive and one of the pairs (A) reaches p<0.05". Although neither of the 6-month window's p values reaches 0.05, in the directional-consistency test across 15 indicators and 72 comparable cells in 03 §4, the share of A/B moving in the same direction at the 6-month horizon is as high as 76% (55/72), the highest in the whole table (60% for 3 months, 63% for 12 months, and only 57% for S4 "no further deep decline"); the 3-month and YTD windows perform worse in this broader consistency test. Overall judgment: the 12M window has a slightly stronger statistical signal on the literal question of "whether it happens to converge near the trough", but the 6M window performs better on the stricter external-validity question of "whether the signal direction is reproducible on two different underlying assets". Each answers a different facet of the hypothesis; no single window wins on both. After Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction, only 19 of 198 testable cells survive at q<0.10, with the smallest q value only 0.04 (03 §3); the 12M and YTD windows each contribute some of the surviving cells, but the number is far too small to claim a "confirmed finding".
5.3 Calendar-year window (02 §6.2, n=18-19 annual observations)
At the calendar-year level (fixed 1/1~12/31, a different period definition from the rolling windows starting on arbitrary trading days in the previous two sections), the years with |Spread|≤10pp are: 5 years for Pair A (2011, 2015, 2016, 2024, 2025) and 6 years for Pair B (2007, 2011, 2016, 2024, 2025, and 2026 for which only some months can be computed). Forward returns after these years: Pair A's 3M/6M averages (+2.90% / +6.65%) are slightly above the full-sample baseline (+0.94% / +4.16%), but the 12M average of +7.77% is actually below the baseline of +10.57%; for Pair B, the averages and medians at all three horizons are all below the unconditional baseline. All circular-shift test p values are >0.4 (far from significant). Conclusion: in 02's independent calculation, the calendar-year window shows no evidence at all supporting the hypothesis, and the two pairs A and B are not even entirely consistent in direction (02 §6.5). This again shows that the definition of the "window" itself (fixed calendar anchors vs. rolling from arbitrary trading days) changes the conclusion, rather than it being merely a matter of period length. 02 §8 has already shown that the same ±10pp threshold is almost always true at the monthly level (96.3% / 92.2% of months qualify, giving no screening power), while at the annual level only about one-third of years qualify; the two cannot be directly compared across frequencies in terms of "how often the convergence signal occurs".
5.4 Confidence-level summary
| Window | Nominal success rate (inside the ±10pp band on the trough day, n=40; 12M also shows the n=24 main sample) | Statistical significance (after BH-FDR correction) | A/B consistency | Overall confidence level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3M | 22.5% (n=40) | No cells survive | Weak (60% same direction, and B is significantly worse in the opposite direction) | Low |
| 6M | 25% (n=40) | Some cells survive but p>0.05 | Highest (76% same direction) | Low to moderate (best consistency, but the standalone statistical test is not passed) |
| 12M | 25% (n=40); main sample 20.8% (n=24) | Pair A p=0.04, some cells q<0.10 | Moderate (63% same direction, but both directions positive) | Moderate (this report considers it relatively the most worth validating first) |
| YTD | 25% (n=40), but no support at all at the annual level | Pair A p=0.03 but Pair B p=0.33, with very different magnitudes | Weak | Low (highly unstable, and the smallest sample, n=14) |
This report's judgment is: if one window is to be chosen for further out-of-sample or mechanized validation, the 12-month window with an absolute ±10pp band is the combination in the existing evidence that is relatively the most worth testing first, because it is the only window that is not the weakest on any of the three criteria of "literal convergence rate on the trough day", "statistical significance" and "directional consistency across the two pairs". But this judgment itself carries the risk of ex-post fitting: it was made only after looking at the results for all four windows, and must pass an out-of-sample test independent of this report's data period before it can be regarded as truly confirmed (see Chapters Nine and Ten for details). The 6-month window, with the highest cross-indicator directional consistency, is the second-priority candidate.
Six. Counterexample analysis
This chapter consolidates the findings for all eight key questions (Key Question 1-8) in 04_counterexamples.md, presented in two categories, "a large decline after convergence" and "no convergence at all near the bottom (false negatives)", and cross-checked against the event table in Chapter Four.
(I) Counterexamples with a large decline after convergence, ranked by severity:
- The 2022 bear market (the deepest counterexample in this dataset): after Pair B's 6M window converged into the band on 2022-01-04 (Spread +9.88pp, QQQ same-period return +10.55%), QQQ fell another −34.40% to the low 247 trading days later (2022-12-28); the same pair's 3M window converged on 2021-11-22 and fell another −34.76% over 239 trading days (04 KQ3). When this convergence occurred, financing costs were extremely low (dtb3/dff≈0.08%) and volatility rose only moderately (vol63_pre 18.04%→vol63_post 31.47%, about 1.7x), showing that the deep decline was driven mainly by the underlying index's own sustained decline lasting nearly a year, not something financing or volatility mechanisms can explain.
- Before the 2020-02 COVID crash: after Pair A's 6M window converged on 2020-01-24 (Spread +9.04pp, still above the SMA200 at the time), the market fell another −32.37% to the low only 40 trading days later (2020-03-23); volatility in this event surged 8.8x after convergence (vol63_pre 7.01%→vol63_post 61.49%), the most extreme "calm turns violent" case in this dataset (04 KQ3 / KQ5).
- 2007-11→2008-01 and 2008-05/07 (especially pronounced for Pair B): after QQQ's YTD / 12M windows converged on 2007-11-07/09 (Spread +8.3~+9.4pp), it fell another −42.6%~−46.2% to the low 242~244 trading days later (2008-10-27); after the 3M window converged on 2008-05-07 it fell another −46.8% over 138 trading days. Pair A (the SPX side) is almost absent over the same period, showing a markedly asymmetric counterexample strength between the two pairs in 2007-08: Nasdaq triggered convergence earlier and more often, with deeper subsequent declines (04 KQ1).
- 2018-12-24: after Pair A's 12M window converged on 2018-10-10 (51 trading days before the bottom) it fell another −15.86%; Pair B's 12M window's last two events, only 41 and 39 trading days before the bottom respectively, still fell another −13.21% / −13.90%. Even the "most recent" convergence event can still have a double-digit decline ahead of it (04 KQ2).
- The 2025-04-08 tariff shock: after Pair B's 6M window converged on 2025-02-19 (Spread +8.37pp), it fell another −22.88% in only 34 trading days, the second-deepest main-window counterexample in this dataset outside 2022 (04 KQ4).
(II) Counterexamples in the directly opposite direction (the Spread on the trough day was still strongly positive and never converged): the 2010 April-July flash-crash correction is this report's cleanest single opposite-direction counterexample. On the trough day (2010-07-02) the 12M Spread for Pair A / Pair B was +13.6pp / +17.6pp respectively, far above the +10pp upper edge; the Spread never converged, let alone marked the bottom (01a §6.2). At the 2018-02 Volmageddon trough (2018-02-08) the 12M Spread for Pair A / Pair B was even higher at +14.09pp / +22.94pp (01b §1.3); at the QQQ-side troughs of 2020-09 and 2021-03 the Spread was +29.15pp and +37.62pp respectively (see the table in Chapter Four). These events show that in some sharp drops (especially corrections with shallower declines, where volatility spikes but the market does not sink into a bear market), the leveraged ETF actually keeps a high positive Spread on the bottom day because it had recently been far ahead, which is the exact opposite of the hypothesis's direction.
(III) False negatives: no convergence at all near the bottom: the two true bottoms of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis are the cleanest false-negative cases in this dataset. At Pair B's bottom on 2008-11-20 (QQQ drawdown of −53.55% from the prior high), the Spread in the four main windows 12M / 3M / 6M / YTD never entered the ±10pp or ±5pp band within ±20 trading days of the bottom, and the most recent qualifying convergence event was far back, 262 trading days (about 1.04 years) earlier. At Pair A's bottom on 2009-03-09, the 12M / 6M windows likewise never touched the convergence band, with the most recent qualifying events 407 / 537 trading days (about 1.6 / 2.1 years) earlier (04 KQ7). By contrast, the three V-shaped bottoms of 2018-12-24, 2020-03 and 2025-04-08 superficially "touched" the convergence band (with the wide 10pp band, almost all are true), but a close look at the trigger timing shows that these touches mostly occurred in the middle of the decline path rather than at its end (with 12~51 trading days and 13%~31% of decline still to go), an illusion of "arriving late but happening to hit" rather than a truly useful entry-timing signal. Moreover, the window length itself determines whether a false negative occurs: in long windows (12M / YTD), the denominator falls steadily as the crash unfolds, keeping the Spread stuck at deeply negative values for long periods (true false negatives), while short windows (3M / 6M), with more frequent rebound-and-pullback swings, more easily "accidentally" approach the convergence band; but such approaches are noise-like chance, not evidence that the methodology itself has predictive power. The two 2022 bottoms (2022-10-12, 2022-12-28) show true false negatives in long windows (12M / YTD) while short windows (3M / 6M) "hit" the band, again proving that window length is the key variable (04 KQ7).
(IV) The share of "false convergence" in calm consolidation periods is far higher than genuine counterexamples: using the four main windows 3M/6M/12M/YTD for Pair A / Pair B and the +10pp band, there are 744 convergence events in the full dataset. Of these, 462 (62.1%, 95% CI about 58.6%~65.6%) saw a maximum decline to the low within the next 252 trading days of no more than −8% (that is, nothing happened); 226 (30.4%) reached this report's −10% counterexample threshold (of which 68 / 9.1% reached the −20% severe level); the remaining 53 (7.1%) fall in a gray zone (04 KQ6). This share, in which more than 6 in every ten foreshadowed nothing at all, is in itself strong evidence against the hypothesis that "convergence represents support": if the convergence signal truly corresponded to some market-bottom support mechanism, the share of calm cases should be far below this level. Calm cases appear across all volatility environments (VIX from 10.86 to 20.66), showing that the sub-hypothesis that "convergence signals are more reliable when VIX is low" is likewise unsupported.
An honest conclusion at the mechanism level (04 KQ5): the before/after volatility ratios of the eight flagship counterexample events show two different failure paths: the "calm turns violent" type (2020 COVID 8.8x, 2018-Q4 2.6x, 2015-16 2.1x) and the "volatility already elevated in a bear market, deteriorating gradually" type (2008 nearly flat, 2022 only 1.7x). Financing costs (DFF/DTB3) did change with the interest-rate environment (entry points in 2011/2015-16/2022 near 0%, 2025 as high as about 4.3%~4.8%), but there is no monotonic relationship with the depth of the subsequent decline: the two deepest counterexamples in this dataset (2022 at −34.40% and 2020 at −32.37%) both happened to occur when financing costs were low. What really determines the severity of failure is the underlying index's own decline and its duration after convergence, and this is exogenous information that the Spread convergence signal itself does not contain at all and cannot predict.
Seven. Review of existing research
This chapter consolidates the findings of Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support/05_literature_practice.md (the literature-review line from the previous research run). Core conclusion: after a systematic search (WebSearch with multiple keyword sets, restricted to sites such as papers.ssrn.com, quantpedia.com, alphaarchitect.com, sentimentrader.com, nber.org and cfainstitute.org), no paper, issuer research or practitioner backtest was found that directly uses "the N-period return difference (or ratio, or decay magnitude) between a leveraged ETF and its underlying" to predict market rebounds or as a timing signal. The hypothesis tested in this report is a brand-new, never-validated proposition in the literature.
The three closest categories of adjacent literature: (1) Mathematical-identity type: Avellaneda & Zhang (2010), detailed in Chapter Three, proves that the Spread is fully determined by the underlying's return, realized volatility and financing cost; Hsieh, Chang & Chen (2025, arXiv 2504.20116) further point out that leveraged ETFs outperform their target multiple in trending (positively autocorrelated) markets and lag in mean-reverting markets, but do not test returns after convergence; Bianchi & Goldberg (2026, arXiv 2604.27287) document the phenomenon in 2022-01~2023-12 where the S&P 500 rose but 2/3x leveraged ETF returns were sharply negative, decomposing about two-thirds of it to compounding and volatility and one-third to the covariance between deviation from fixed leverage and the index return. (2) Fund-flow sentiment-indicator type: the "Speculation Sentiment Index" built by Davies (2022, JFQA 57(7):2485–2515, a top journal, evidence grade (b)), constructed from the difference in changes in shares outstanding of leveraged long versus short funds, shows that retail investors increase net creations of leveraged long funds in down months, and that this sentiment index negatively predicts returns over the following 1-6 months (a 1-standard-deviation increase in SSI is followed by an average −1.14% for the S&P 500 the next month). The direction is opposite to the hypothesis: in declines, retail investors chase leveraged longs, and on average they are not buying at the bottom. SentimenTrader (2023, vendor research, evidence grade (b-low)) uses a reversal after extreme pessimism in the ratio of leveraged long to short trading value as a buy signal; in 35 precedents the S&P 500 was up two months later 83% of the time, a direction leaning toward support but without the full sample or return magnitudes; CXO Advisory (2015, b-low) tested the Rydex 2X/−2X asset ratio and concluded it is completely ineffective (R²=0.001). These three measure fund flows / trading value, not return spreads, so their conclusions cannot be borrowed directly. (3) Moving-average / trend-management rule type: the core argument of Gayed & Bilello (2016, winner of the CMT Association's Dow Award, evidence grade (b)) is that "after breaking below the 200-day moving average, volatility rises and average returns fall, so exposure should be reduced"; a 1928-2015 simulation shows a 2x leveraged rotation at 19.1% annualized (buy-and-hold only 13.7%), but these results rest on simulated leveraged series, and CXO Advisory notes that its financing-cost assumptions are overly optimistic. Importantly, these rules are all "reduce on a break", the exact opposite of this hypothesis's "buy after convergence", and they all miss the first leg of the rebound after the bottom (Gayed & Bilello's own Table 4/5 show that in the 2007-2009 bear market the moving-average rule lost only 10%, but in the 2009-2015 bull market it also gained only 95%, far below buy-and-hold's 260%).
Moskowitz, Ooi & Pedersen (2012, JFEC 104:228–250, a top journal), "Time Series Momentum", provides the most direct opposite-direction evidence: across 58 liquid futures (including 9 developed-country equity index futures), the past 1-12 month return positively predicts the next month's return (persistence), and the effect "performs best during extreme markets". If "convergence" is roughly equivalent to "a decline in the underlying's past return" (an equivalence Chapter Three has shown), then the time-series momentum literature predicts that returns after convergence should be weaker, not the rebound the hypothesis expects. Moreira & Muir (2017, Journal of Finance 72(4)), "Volatility-Managed Portfolios", and its rebuttal Cederburg et al. (2020, JFE 138(1)) further point out that expected returns in high-volatility periods do not rise proportionally, and that any rule adjusting exposure by volatility (including the reverse "add exposure in high volatility") often fails out of sample (72 of 103 strategies lost to the original portfolio). The long-horizon mean-reversion literature (Fama & French 1988; Poterba & Summers 1988) works on a 3-5 year time scale and requires "deep declines", which does not match the situation in which the underlying's return is still positive when convergence events actually occur (+8%~+22%, see Chapters Three and Eight), so it is of almost no use here.
In practice, the only rule close in spirit to "buy leverage after a deep drop" is Jason Kelly's 9Sig (a TQQQ + bond rebalancing strategy): it performed very well over the real-data period (after 2010), but when extended by simulation into the 1999-2002 dot-com bear market, its CAGR falls to 8.28% and its maximum drawdown reaches −99.73%, with a median drawdown of 98% across 2,000 resampled paths. This shows that a "buy leverage when it drops" rule depends heavily on whether the sample includes a long bear market (literature file 05_literature_practice.md, Question Two).
Overall positioning of this report's hypothesis: in the literature this hypothesis should be classified as "a reversal signal on the underlying's past return (adjusted for volatility and interest rates)", and the existing evidence directly adjacent to it (time-series momentum, moving-average management rules) mostly points in the opposite direction from the hypothesis (reduce exposure during declines rather than add at convergence); only one strand of the fund-flow sentiment literature (SentimenTrader's trading-value ratio reversal) leans toward support in direction, but its evidence grade is low, it is not peer reviewed, and it measures a completely different variable (trading value rather than a return spread). In Chapters Six and Eight this report has already used its own data to directly test this hypothesis, equivalent to "a reversal signal on the underlying's past return", and the conclusion agrees with the time-series momentum literature: not supported.
Eight. Confounders and null controls
This chapter consolidates the five questions in 06_null_confounders.md and is the strictest test of the hypothesis in this report. It asks not "what are returns after convergence", but "once the underlying's own return and volatility are controlled for, what is left of the Spread".
(I) The Spread is almost a deterministic function of the underlying's return and volatility, independently verified again: running OLS of the daily 12-month Spread on [R12, R12², RV12, R12×RV12, window-average DFF] gives R²=0.9977 for Pair A (residual standard deviation 0.91pp, versus a standard deviation of 18.85pp for the Spread itself) and R²=0.9951 for Pair B (residual standard deviation 1.65pp), with 4,866 trading days in each sample (06 Question Three A). This independently reaches almost the same conclusion as the theoretical derivation in Chapter Three (05's R²=0.9975~0.9989) with different researchers and different scripts, and the two corroborate each other. Using this model, which "looks only at the underlying's own path + interest rates + fixed fees", to define "model convergence events", 16 (Pair A) and 18 (Pair B) of the 19 real declustered convergence events have a corresponding model event within ±10 trading days. In other words, the convergence events actually observed are almost exactly the events where "the underlying's 12-month return drops to a threshold determined by volatility and interest rates", not an additional independent phenomenon.
(II) After controlling for the underlying's return and volatility, the Spread has no stable incremental predictive power: adding Spread12, a "21 days after the event" dummy and an "inside the tolerance band" state dummy separately to a forward-return regression that already controls for R12 and vol12 (Newey-West standard errors, lag=21×H), the absolute t values of all coefficients are ≤1.76 (06 Question Three B), far from statistically significant. By comparison, with R12 alone the coefficient is negative (Pair B 12M: −0.244, NW t=−2.30), meaning that after low past returns (which also implies a low Spread) the 12-month return is slightly higher but not significantly so. That direction happens to match the hypothesis's expectation, but it does not stand up statistically, and it is everything that "the underlying's own past return" can already explain, with no need to introduce the extra variable of "the leveraged-minus-underlying spread". Of the 12 tests in the matched-sample comparison (matched null, finding control days within ±3pp on each of R12 and vol12), only 1 has p<0.05 (Pair B's 6M horizon, p=0.014), consistent with the roughly 0.6 tests expected to come out positive purely by chance at the 5% significance level (that is, it may be pure chance), and none passes at the Bonferroni-corrected threshold 0.05/12≈0.004. More critically, the same pair's direction at the 6M and 12M horizons actually contradicts itself (Pair B: 6M difference +10.4pp, 12M difference −1.3pp; Pair A: 6M difference −1.4pp, 12M difference +7.4pp; 06 Question Three D). This pattern, where the same phenomenon reverses direction at different horizons, is a typical hallmark of overfitting rather than a real signal.
(III) Long-sample extensions (^GSPC from 1970, ^NDX from 1985) are likewise unsupportive, and Nasdaq even shows a significant opposite-direction result: using "model convergence events" defined only from the index's own data to enlarge the sample 2-3x (52 declustered events for ^GSPC, 40 for ^NDX), the results do not become more supportive of the hypothesis. The S&P 500's average 6-month return after events is only slightly above the unconditional average (+7.4% vs +4.6%), and the matched differences of −0.7pp~+1.7pp are all insignificant; the Nasdaq-100's matched 12-month difference is −11.7pp (p=0.033), in the opposite direction from the hypothesis (06 Question Three E). The worst model events all occurred near bubble tops: ^NDX 2000-09-18 (−54.1% 6 months after the event, −65.8% after 12 months) and 2007-12-11 (−43.3% after 12 months). These are typical cases of "the underlying's 12-month return weakening after choppy trading at high levels" being misjudged as "convergence".
(IV) The cost confounder has been quantified year by year, and its magnitude is comparable to the tolerance band itself: the annual log drag measured as "SSO/QLD actual total return − frictionless 2x index return" has a correlation of −0.97 (SSO) / −0.96 (QLD) with that year's average federal funds rate (DFF), with a slope of about −1.2~−1.4 (for every 1 percentage point rise in rates, the leveraged ETF loses about 1.2~1.4 percentage points per year). In zero-rate years (2010-2016) SSO's actual return was even higher than the frictionless 2x by about 2.5~3.5pp (the effect of dividends magnified through leverage outweighed fees), while in 2023-2025 (DFF 4.2%~5.1%) it was lower by about 3.4~4.2pp (06 Question Four C). Translated into the "price-return Spread" the hypothesis uses, the same drag means that the underlying 12-month return corresponding to the same "Spread=+10pp" threshold needs to be about +18.8% in 2024 (high rates) but only about +10.9% in 2013 (near-zero rates) (06 Question Five). The fixed ±10pp tolerance band actually represents completely different market states under different interest-rate regimes. This matches the theoretical derivation in Chapter Three (R* rises with cT) exactly, a consistent conclusion reached from different angles by two independent research lines.
(V) Convergence events systematically occur in regions where the underlying is still rising, not declining or at the bottom: across 38 convergence events (06's own declustered set), the range of the underlying's 12-month return is +7.9%~+19.5% for Pair A and +8.2%~+22.2% for Pair B; not a single one occurred when the underlying's 12-month return was negative, and the pullback from the 52-week high was mostly less than 12% (06 Question Five). This is fully consistent with the theory in Chapter Three, the full scan grid in Chapter Five (62%~65% of events occur in calm markets) and the false-negative analysis in Chapter Six, forming a cross-confirmation from three independent research paths: what "convergence" should be compared against is actually the path after "the underlying's 12-month return falls back from high levels to about +10%~+20%", not the path "after a panic".
The plainest one-sentence summary of this chapter: for the hypothesis to hold, one must show that the "leveraged-minus-underlying spread" variable still carries independent, directionally consistent incremental information after controlling for the underlying's own return and volatility; the three independent tests in this chapter (deterministic function fit, control regressions, matched-sample placebo test), as well as the long-sample extensions, all failed to find this incremental information, and the long-sample extension for the Nasdaq-100 even found statistically significant opposite-direction evidence.
Nine. List of data gaps
The data gaps listed by each of the seven research lines are compiled below, grouped by type, and each is explicitly labeled a "data gap" rather than glossed over.
(I) Sample size and limits on statistical inference (affecting the interpretation of all conclusions):
- The study's "independent events" are far fewer than the apparent sample count: of the 24 main events in 2006-2012, there are only about 6-7 truly independent market cycles (the 2006 minor correction, the 2007-2009 bear market, the 2010 flash crash, the 2011 downgrade, and the two 2012 corrections); the GFC parent event and its 16 mid-crisis trough sub-events overlap heavily and are not independent samples (01a §10).
- The unconditional baseline of the full scan grid is itself built on about 20 years of history, and the 12-month window has only about 19-20 "approximately independent" samples (03 §10); the full grid tested 672 combinations, a classic multiple-comparison situation, and only 19 cells survive BH-FDR correction, which should still be regarded as "candidates" rather than "confirmed".
- The calendar-year analysis (02) has only 18-19 complete annual observations in the full sample; after splitting three ways by base_cat, a single cell often holds only 1-6 records, so all quantitative comparisons of "returns after convergence" are for directional reference only (02 §9).
- SSO/QLD only listed from 2006-06-21, and the "truly systemic crisis" events they span are just two, the 2008-09 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID crash, so no conclusion should be over-extrapolated to "all bear markets" (03 §11).
(II) Gaps in the data itself:
- VXN (the Nasdaq-100 volatility index) has public historical data only from 2009-09-14; VXN figures during the 2008 financial crisis come from a single source, FRED
VXNCLS, and cannot be cross-checked against two sources as VIX can (01a §10). - The VOO proxy error (SPY used as a proxy before 2010-09-09) could not itself be independently quantified and validated (VOO did not exist before then, so it cannot be backtested), but research lines 06/03 each measured a median absolute VOO-SPY difference over the overlap period of only 0.03-0.05pp, with a 99th-percentile absolute value of only 0.52-0.63pp, and judged that this proxy error has no material effect on the conclusions (01a §10; 03 §7).
- VOO's Yahoo dividend-event series is missing the 2014-12 ex-dividend event, so VOO's total return for 2014 (and for 2014Q4 and the month of 2014-12) is understated by about 0.5-0.6pp; this issue does not affect the primary price-return basis (02 §3.3).
- Historical expense-ratio data for SSO / QLD in 2006-2015 could not be obtained (only the current expense ratios captured on 2026-10-23/24 are available: SSO 0.84%/0.88%, QLD 0.89%/0.96%), so it cannot be verified whether expense ratios during the financial crisis differed from today's (04 KQ5; 06 Question Four Gaps).
- The issuer-disclosed swap financing spreads and NAV tracking error (as opposed to market-price tracking error) were not obtained; "the swaps receive total return (including dividends)" is an inference backed out from the regression intercept and has not been checked against the original N-CSR text (06 Question Four Gaps).
- The original SEC N-CSR financial report (ProShares Trust 2008 annual report) could not be read because the file exceeds WebFetch's 10MB limit, so the third-party check of SSO's 2008 return could rely only on aggregator-site summaries, and the confidence level is moderate rather than fully consistent (01a §10).
(III) Untested sensitivity of methodological choices:
- The "convergence event" definition requires the Spread to have been ≥+10pp within the previous 126 trading days, and for the GFC sub-events the arming-threshold peak uniformly uses the bear market's overall high rather than each sub-event's own local peak; a different anchor definition could yield different event counts and lead days, and this study did not perform that sensitivity analysis (01a §10).
- The caliper (±3pp), cooldown (126 days) and exclusion window (±63 days) of the matched-sample comparison were all set in advance, with no sensitivity analysis (06 Question Three Gaps).
- The "calm / failure" shares for the narrow 5pp band were not recomputed (only the full shares for the wide 10pp band were computed); listed as a data gap (04 KQ6 Gaps).
- The "false negative" definition (whether the tolerance band was touched within ±20 trading days) is looser than the "qualifying convergence event", and this study did not test how the results change under a tightened definition (04 KQ7 Gaps).
(IV) Gaps in literature and external cross-checks:
- No independent article was found that specifically discusses SSO/QLD's actual performance during the 2011 US debt downgrade, the 2015-16 China worries, or the stock-market adjustment in the fourth quarter of 2018 (04 KQ8 Gaps).
- The original formulas / mathematical details of five papers, Cheng & Madhavan (2009), Lu/Wang/Zhang (2012), Jarrow (2010), Charupat & Miu (2011) and Leung & Santoli (2012/2016), could not be checked against the full text; only secondhand summaries are cited (05 theory §8).
- The r/LETFs wiki and the Bogleheads "Leveraged SMA200 Strategy" thread could not be read because of fetching-tool limits (403/inaccessible), so it could not be confirmed whether the community has ever discussed this hypothesis ([
05_literature_practice.mdQuestion One/Two Gaps]). - Two arXiv papers ("Long-Term Returns Estimation of Leveraged Indexes and ETFs" and "Compounding Effects in Leveraged ETFs: Beyond the Volatility Drag Paradigm") appeared in search results but their full texts were not actually retrieved and read (04 KQ8 Gaps).
(V) Questions this report cannot answer, which require an entirely different research design:
- "After controlling for the underlying index's own return, does the Spread still have incremental explanatory power?" Chapter Eight has tried its best to answer this with matched samples and control regressions, but the sample size (9-13 events/tests) is too small for a decisive conclusion; a rigorous answer needs far more than 19-24 annual/event observations (for example, a rolling-window design that correctly handles nEff, or cross-market validation including other markets and ETFs with other leverage multiples), which is beyond the scope of this task (02 §9 Gaps; 06 Question Three Inferences).
- The separate contributions of financing cost and the fund's internal expense ratio to the "cost drag" have not been decomposed, nor has it been tested whether that drag differs significantly across interest-rate environments (02 §9 Gaps).
- Throughout, this report built no executable trading rules, included no trading costs/slippage, did no equity-curve simulation and did no out-of-sample validation of any kind. These are the scope deliberately left for follow-up work in the "recommendations for the computational version" in Chapters Ten and Eleven, and are not answered in this report.
Ten. Recommendations for the computational version
This chapter answers "if this hypothesis is to be written as a programmatic rule and validated further, which indicators should be validated first, which window/tolerance-band ranges, and which counterexample periods must be specifically tested". The recommended priority order directly reflects the strength of the findings in Chapters Five, Six and Eight, rather than the literal order of the user's original hypothesis.
(I) Indicators to validate first (ranked by confidence):
- 12-month rolling return difference (Spread_12M) + absolute ±10pp band: Chapter Five shows this is the only combination that is not the weakest on any of the three criteria of "literal success rate", "statistical significance (p=0.04)" and "consistent direction across the two pairs", and it should be the first candidate rule to be programmed.
- 6-month rolling return difference (Spread_6M) + absolute ±10pp band: it has the highest directional consistency across the two pairs (76%); even though a single statistical test is not passed, its cross-asset reproducibility merits priority cross-validation.
- A cost-adjusted "adjusted Spread": Chapter Eight proves that the fixed ±10pp band represents different underlying return levels under different interest-rate regimes (a difference of about 8 percentage points between 2013 and 2024). When programming, it is recommended to use a residual net of theoretical decay such as
Spread_adj = Spread − (realized_vol²×T + period_mean_DFF×T + fund_expense_ratio×T)(i.e., the "residual" defined by research lines 05/06) rather than the raw Spread, so that comparisons across interest-rate regimes are possible. This is a recommendation, not a conclusion this report has validated: 06's residual analysis shows that although the coefficient's direction is consistently positive (Pair A 12M NW t=5.19), the non-overlapping t is only 1.87, so a larger sample is still needed for confirmation. - Indicators not recommended for priority investment of resources: the YTD window (the smallest sample and the least consistent direction across the two pairs); the W6 family (rate of change in each SMA's own length; 03 §5 shows it has the worst directional consistency, with only 65% of Pair B cells positive).
(II) Specific recommended values for window and tolerance-band ranges:
- Window: lock in 6M and 12M first; 3M has lower priority because single-day noise makes up too large a share (at the monthly level ±10pp is almost always true and has no screening power, 02 §5).
- Tolerance band: the absolute ±10pp band takes priority over the narrow ±5pp band (the narrow band's sample is usually only one-third of the wide band's, giving weaker statistical power, 03 §2); if resources allow, a "relative band + floor" version should be tested at the same time (such as ±10%~20% of |base|, requiring |base|≥2pp); research lines 06/03 both observed that the floor version raises the diff of some cells while shrinking the sample (03 §6).
- Arming threshold (P, the lead level required to have been reached in the past 126 trading days): it is recommended to test both +10pp and +20pp. With P=20pp the event count drops sharply (for example, Pair A's W1 event count goes 29→7), but 03 §2 shows that some cells actually have a larger diff_fwd6M at P=20 (e.g. A/W1/abs5: +2.80pp at P=10, +8.00pp at P=20), which merits cross-comparison, but note that the sample has fallen to single digits and the conclusion is unstable.
(III) Counterexample periods that must be specifically tested (they should serve as "veto tests" during programmatic validation, not merely as reference): before deployment, any programmatic rule must at least pass backtest checks for the following five periods; if it generates a "buy" signal in these periods followed immediately by major losses, the rule should be regarded as having failed:
- 2010-07-02 (the flash-crash correction trough): on this day the Spread's direction is directly opposite (+13.6pp/+17.6pp), and the rule should not misjudge it as "converged".
- 2018-02-08 (Volmageddon): the Spread that day was +14.09pp/+22.94pp; same as above.
- 2022-01-04 to 2022-12-28 (the full-year QLD/QQQ bear market): this is the deepest cluster of counterexamples in this dataset; any rule that had already judged convergence in 2022-01 should explicitly track whether the equity curve over all of 2022 could withstand the subsequent further decline of -34.4%.
- 2008-11-20 and 2009-03-09 (the true financial-crisis bottoms): if the rule "never issues a signal", that is the correct behavior (the real data never converged either); the definition should not be loosened to make these two days trigger just to raise the trigger rate, otherwise the definition has drifted from the spirit of the original hypothesis.
- 2020-02 to 2020-03 (the eve of the COVID crash): this is the extreme case where volatility surged 8.8x; any rule that relies on "realized volatility before the event" for risk control should be tested on whether it can still cut exposure in time when volatility jumps this abruptly.
(IV) Recommendations on statistical method: any follow-up programmatic validation must, following the approach in 03 §3, run a circular-shift null test for every "indicator × window × band × threshold" combination, and apply Benjamini-Hochberg (or the stricter Bonferroni) multiple-comparison correction across all combinations; any analysis that "picks the best-looking cell" without first doing a full grid scan and correction should be regarded as methodologically untrustworthy (Chapter Five has shown that even after a full grid scan, only 19 cells have q<0.10).
Eleven. Draft preliminary decision rules
None of the rules in this chapter have been validated out of sample. They are if/then drafts derived from the descriptive findings of Chapters Four through Eight, offered as a starting point for a later computational implementation, and should not be used directly for actual capital allocation.
Rule 1 (core signal, confidence level: low to moderate)
IF the 12-month rolling Spread (SSO−VOO or QLD−QQQ) was ≥ +10pp at some point in the past 126 trading days
AND the current |Spread_12M| ≤ 10pp (entered from above)
AND the underlying asset's own drawdown from its 52-week high < 20% (i.e., not mid-way through a deep bear market; see the "false negative" findings in Chapter Six)
THEN flag it as a "weakly supportive observational signal", which does not constitute an independent basis for buying;
historical comparison: this combination of conditions occurred 5/24 times (20.8%) in the 2006-2012 main sample,
3 of them genuinely qualifying convergences (successes) and 2 numerical coincidences (no arming path);
in the 2013-2026 sample about 14/38 times (36.8%) fell literally inside the band,
but at least 2 of them (both pairs of E10a) were still followed by a negative 12-month return.
Rule 2 (counterexample veto, confidence level: moderate; this is an observed robust pattern, not a statistically significant conclusion)
IF Spread_12M is still ≥ +10pp on the trough day (opposite direction, as in the 2010 and 2018-02 cases)
OR realized volatility (63-day annualized) has risen > 3x relative to the 63 days before the event
THEN it should not be judged a convergence signal; if Rule 1 misfires, this rule should veto it.
Rule 3 (interest-rate adjustment, confidence level: low; the recommended direction is clear but the quantitative coefficients have not been validated out of sample)
IF the current annualized financing cost (mean DFF + fund expense ratio) differs from the historical average (about 2%) by > 2pp
THEN the fixed ±10pp tolerance band should be recalibrated using the Chapter Three formula R*=exp(σ²T+cT)−1,
rather than reusing the same absolute number for comparisons across interest-rate regimes (see the confounder analysis in Chapter Eight).
Rule 4 (veto list, confidence level: moderately high; taken directly from the validated counterexamples in Chapter Six)
IF the current date falls near the five veto-test periods required for historical validation
(2010-07, 2018-02, all of 2022, 2008-11/2009-03, 2020-02~03)
THEN regardless of whether Rule 1 triggers, always flag it as "high risk, manual review",
and do not execute automatically.
The judgment these four rules form together is: even accepting this report's judgment about "which window/band is most worth validating" (12M/10pp), treating it as an independently actionable buy signal still lacks the support of statistical strength. Over the past 20 years of historical samples, its hit rate is unstable (20.8%~36.8%, swinging widely with the types of market conditions the sample covers), it is only marginally significant after strict multiple-comparison correction, and its direction directly contradicts at least 5 major historical events. This report recommends that any computational implementation first treat these rules as a research hypothesis that "has not yet been refuted but is far from proven", not as trading logic ready to go live.
Twelve. Complete list of reference sources
Own calculations (evidence grade (a); data sources and script paths are detailed in the corresponding sections of each research note)
| Research line | Note path | Coverage | Main scripts/outputs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01a | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/01a_events_2006_2012.md |
2006-06-21~2012-12-31 systematic peak-trough events | data/events_2006_2012/events_2006_2012.py, event_list.csv, event_drawdowns.csv, event_anchor_returns.csv, event_trough_vol.csv, event_trough_sma.csv, event_forward_returns.csv, event_convergence_leadlag.csv |
| 01b | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/01b_events_2013_2026.md |
2013-01-01~2026-10-22 systematic peak-trough events | data/events_2013_2026/{common.py,find_drawdowns.py,analysis.py,verify_dates.py}, events.csv, drawdowns_systematic.csv |
| 02 | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/02_annual_quarterly_returns.md |
Calendar annual/quarterly/monthly returns and Spread (2006-2026) | data/returns/{calc_periods.py,crosscheck.py}, annual.csv, quarterly.csv, monthly.csv, crosscheck_annual.csv, decay_regression.txt |
| 03 | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/03_convergence_event_scan.md |
Full scan of 15 indicators × 8 bands × 2 thresholds × 2 pairs (2006-2026) | data/scan/{common.py,convergence_scan.py,analyze.py,explore.py,rstar_check.py}, events_all.csv, summary.csv, baseline.csv, analysis_tables.md, summary_with_q.csv, rstar_check.csv |
| 04 | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/04_counterexamples.md |
Counterexamples and false negatives (2006-2026) | data/counter/counter_analysis.py, events_all.csv (4742 records), counterexamples.csv (762 records), bottoms_false_negatives.csv (138 records) |
| 05 | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/05_theory_volatility_decay.md |
Theoretical derivation and empirical fit (2006-2026) | data/theory/{theory_tables.py,empirical_check.py}, theory_grid.csv, event_check.csv, annual_check.csv, fullfit_summary.csv, band_entry_summary.csv |
| 06 | research_notes/Leveraged ETF return convergence and market support 2/06_null_confounders.md |
Null controls and cost confounders (2007-2026, plus extensions from 1970/1985) | data/null/{null_analysis.py,diag_resid.py,diag_decomp.py,synth_long.py}, own_return_conditional.csv, incremental_regressions.csv, matched_null.csv, confounders_by_year.csv, threshold_in_own_return_space.csv, long_history_model_events.csv |
Shared raw data: Yahoo Finance v8 chart API (SSO/QLD/SPY/VOO/QQQ/^GSPC/^NDX/^VIX/^VXN/^IRX), https://query1.finance.yahoo.com/v8/finance/chart/{TICKER}?period1=0&period2=9999999999&interval=1d&events=div%2Csplit&includeAdjustedClose=true, downloaded around 2026-10-23 11:34 UTC and stored in each research line's data/prices/*.json; FRED fredgraph.csv (VIXCLS, VXNCLS, DFF, DTB3, SOFR); official CBOE history files cdn.cboe.com/api/global/us_indices/daily_prices/{VIX,VXN}_History.csv.
Third-party research and official data (evidence grade (b))
- Avellaneda, M. & Zhang, S. (2010). "Path-Dependence of Leveraged ETF Returns." SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 1, 586–603. PDF | SSRN (full text read; source of the core formula)
- Davies, S. W. (2022). "Speculation Sentiment." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 57(7), 2485–2515. Full text
- Moskowitz, T. J., Ooi, Y. H. & Pedersen, L. H. (2012). "Time Series Momentum." Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 228–250. Full-text PDF
- Moreira, A. & Muir, T. (2017). "Volatility-Managed Portfolios." Journal of Finance, 72(4), 1611–1644. Wiley | NBER w22208
- Cederburg, S., O'Doherty, M. S., Wang, F. & Yan, X. S. (2020). "On the Performance of Volatility-Managed Portfolios." Journal of Financial Economics, 138(1), 95–117. ScienceDirect
- Cheng, M. & Madhavan, A. (2009). "The Dynamics of Leveraged and Inverse Exchange-Traded Funds." Journal of Investment Management, 7, 43–62. Semantic Scholar
- Ivanov, I. & Lenkey, S. (2018). "Do Leveraged ETFs Really Amplify Late-Day Returns and Volatility?" Journal of Financial Markets. SSRN
- Bai, Q., Bond, S. A. & Hatch, B. C. "The Impact of Leveraged and Inverse ETFs on Underlying Stock Returns." SSRN 1716999
- Lenkey, S. L. (2024). "The Market Impact of Leveraged ETFs: A Survey of the Literature." Quantitative Finance and Economics. AIMS Press
- Jain, P. K., Mishra, S., Pagano, M. S. & Rodriguez, I. M. "Of Seesaws and Swings: The Market-wide Impact of Levered ETF Rebalancing during Stressful Times." EFMA 2024. PDF
- Hsieh, C.-H., Chang, J.-R. & Chen, H. H. (2025). "Compounding Effects in Leveraged ETFs: Beyond the Volatility Drag Paradigm." arXiv:2504.20116. arXiv
- Bianchi, S. W. & Goldberg, L. R. (2026). "A Levered ETF Anomaly Explained." arXiv:2604.27287. arXiv
- Frazzini, A. & Pedersen, L. H. (2012). "Embedded Leverage." NBER Working Paper 18558. NBER
- Gayed, M. A. & Bilello, C. V. (2016). "Leverage for the Long Run." SSRN 2741701 | Full-text PDF (CMT Dow Award)
- Faber, M. T. (2006/2007). "A Quantitative Approach to Tactical Asset Allocation." Journal of Wealth Management. Full-text PDF
- Trainor, W. J. Jr. & Baryla, E. A. Jr. (2007). "Leveraged ETFs: A Risky Double That Doesn't Multiply by Two." Journal of Financial Planning (full text read)
- Charupat, N. & Miu, P. (2011). "The Pricing and Performance of Leveraged Exchange-Traded Funds." Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(4), 966–977. IDEAS/RePEc
- Leung, T. & Santoli, M. (2016). Leveraged Exchange-Traded Funds: Price Dynamics and Options Valuation. Springer. Springer
- Lu, L., Wang, J. & Zhang, G. (2012). "Long Term Performance of Leveraged ETFs." Financial Services Review, 21, 63–80. ResearchGate
- Jarrow, R. (2010). "Understanding the Risk of Leveraged ETFs." Finance Research Letters, 7(3), 135–139. ScienceDirect
- Fama, E. & French, K. (1988). "Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices." Journal of Political Economy, 96, 246–273. JPE
- Poterba, J. & Summers, L. (1988). "Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications." Journal of Financial Economics. NBER w2343
- De Bondt, W. & Thaler, R. (1985). "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" Journal of Finance, 40. Wiley
- Zarattini, Mele & Aziz (2025). As summarized by Quantpedia; original SSRN 5316487 (original not read)
- FINRA Regulatory Notice 09-31. FINRA (official regulatory document, full text read)
- ProShares Ultra S&P500 (SSO) Summary Prospectus (2026-09-28). proshares.com/sso (full text read; source of the expense ratio / Estimated Fund Returns table)
- ProShares Ultra QQQ (QLD) Summary Prospectus (2026-09-28). proshares.com/qld (full text read)
- FRED DFF / DTB3 / SOFR. fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFF | DTB3 | SOFR
- Wikipedia. "United States bear market of 2007–2009." Link (used for third-party checking of the 2007-09 bear-market decline)
- Macroption. "VIX All-Time Highs and Biggest Spikes." Link (used for third-party checking of the 2008-11-20 VIX close)
- CNBC (2019). "10 years ago this week, the market hit the climactic bottom of the Great Recession." Link (used for third-party checking of Nasdaq bottoming first)
Practitioner research, vendors and media (evidence grade (b-low) to (c); reservations noted at citation)
- CXO Advisory (2015/2016). "Testing the Rydex 2X/-2X Mutual Fund Asset Ratio"; "Leveraging the U.S. Stock Market Based on SMA Rules." Link 1 | Link 2
- SentimenTrader (Dean Christians, 2023-09-01). "A real money sentiment indicator triggers a buy signal." Link
- FinLab (2026). "ETF Rotation Strategy Backtest." Link
- BestFolio (2026). "Kelly Signal Danger" (9Sig backtest). Link
- Optimized Portfolio / summitward (HEDGEFUNDIE summaries). Link 1 | Link 2
- IVolatility. "Does High VIX Predict SPY Declines? Part I." Link
- etfdb.com "Leveraged Decay" article and related Yahoo Finance / Seeking Alpha articles (secondhand accounts of 2022 QLD/TQQQ declines, evidence grade (c), originals not individually verified via WebFetch)
- Dimensional (2023-08-17). "Stock Gains Can Add Up after Big Declines." Link
- Stansberry (2025-04-26); CNBC (2025-04-21); WealthManagement (reports on leveraged ETF fund flows in April 2025, evidence grade (b-low) to (c)). Stansberry | CNBC
- TradingView public scripts (200 SMA buffer band, evidence grade (c), win-rate figures not verified). Link 1 | Link 2
- Jason Kelly 9Sig explanation page (not read; via BestFolio's account). jasonkelly.com
- totalrealreturns.com (TRR), Portfolio Visualizer (PV), used for third-party checking of annual total returns in section 02. TRR query
This report's overall concluding position: five independent research paths (event identification ×2, the full scan grid, null-control regressions, theoretical derivation) and the literature review are methodologically independent of one another, yet they reach a highly consistent, cautious conclusion about the hypothesis of "leveraged ETF return convergence as a signal of the market stopping its decline and rebounding": the existing evidence is insufficient to support the strong version of this hypothesis. A weaker, more conditional statement ("in corrections with shallower declines, convergence is sometimes roughly coincident with the bottom, but in deep bear markets and sharp drops, convergence often comes early, points in the directly opposite direction, or never happens") has partial descriptive support, but after strict statistical testing and multiple-comparison correction the signal strength that holds up is very limited (strongest surviving cell q=0.04), and it can in essence be fully explained by a deterministic function containing no independent information: "the underlying's own past return + realized volatility + financing cost". "The evidence is insufficient to support this hypothesis" is the conclusion this report considers most accurate and least over-extended.
Further reading
- SSO returns and technicals (Chinese), QLD returns and technicals (Chinese), VOO (Chinese), QQQ (Chinese)
- Watchlist comparison: VOO vs SSO one-year returns (Chinese), QQQ vs QLD one-year returns (Chinese)
- Signal combinations can frame a bottom, but cannot pinpoint the lowest point
- A quant guide to US stocks: before quant trading, quantify the "market state" first
Frequently asked questions
Is convergence of the return spread between SSO, QLD and VOO, QQQ a signal that the market will stop falling and rebound?
This study's conclusion is that the strong version is not supported. In the 2006-2012 main sample (12M window, ±10pp band), only 5 of 24 events (20.8%) fell inside the band on the trough day; in the 2013-2026 sample, about 14 of 38 paired observations (36.8%) did. After circular-shift testing plus Benjamini-Hochberg correction, only 19 of 198 testable cells survive at q<0.10.
Why does return-spread convergence usually not happen at the bottom?
Because this spread is almost entirely determined by the underlying's N-period return, realized volatility, and financing and fee costs: fitted with the Avellaneda & Zhang (2010) exact compounding formula, R² reaches 0.9975~0.9989. At the moment the Spread drops into the tolerance band from above, the underlying's same-period return was positive in 100% of 24 scenarios, with medians of +4.9% to +15.7%; 62%~65% of convergence events occur in calm markets where the underlying is less than 5% below its 52-week high.
Can the market still fall sharply after convergence?
Yes. In 2022, after Pair B's 6M window converged into the band on 2022-01-04, QQQ fell another −34.40%; after Pair A's 6M window converged on 2020-01-24, the market fell another −32.37% within 40 trading days; after QQQ's YTD / 12M windows converged from 2007-11 into 2008, it fell another −42.6%~−46.2%. Of the 744 convergence events in the full dataset, 226 (30.4%) saw a decline of −10% within the next 252 trading days.
Which observation window and tolerance band are most worth validating again?
The report considers the 12-month window with an absolute ±10pp band relatively the most worth testing first (Pair A p=0.04), followed by the 6-month window, because it has the highest directional consistency across the two pairs (76%, 55/72 cells in the same direction). But this choice was made only after seeing all the windows, carries ex-post selection risk, and needs an out-of-sample test to be confirmed.
Does the level of interest rates affect this signal?
Yes. The same "Spread=+10pp" threshold corresponds to an underlying 12-month return of about +18.8% in 2024 (high rates), but only about +10.9% in 2013 (near-zero rates). The correlation between the leveraged ETFs' annual drag and the federal funds rate reaches −0.97 (SSO) / −0.96 (QLD); for every 1 percentage point rise in rates, they lose about 1.2~1.4 percentage points per year.
How is the volatility decay of a 2x leveraged ETF calculated?
With 2x leverage, L(R) = (1+R)²·k − 1, k = exp[−(σ²T + cT)]; the point where the Spread returns to zero is R* = exp(σ²T + cT) − 1. With a 12-month window, 20% annualized volatility and 3% annualized cost, R*≈+7.3%, rising to +10.5% at 6% cost.